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INTRODUCTION  1. 
In this article, we will try to 
raise a warning about the apparent 
contradiction between the militaries’ 
and politicians’ wish to have an army 
equipped to the level of the most 
powerful allies and the socio-economic 
status of Romania, which does not allow 
strong support for the defense sector.
Once we present the statistical 
indicators through which we compare 
our country with other allied states, 
we will see to what extent the defense 
system is “under-funded”, according 
to the prominent ﬁ  gures in political life 
that are close to the defense system.
We then try to demonstrate the 
need and usefulness of a strategic 
analysis, and ﬁ   nally we try to 
ﬁ   nd solutions for increasing the 
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effectiveness and efﬁ   ciency of the 
national defense system, using the 
obvious opportunities provided by 
the EU and NATO membership.
2. NATIONAL DEFENSE 
SYSTEM’ S“UNDER – FUNDING”
We talk below about the numbers 
related to the national defense 
system. “Figures - noted a friend the 
other day - have at this time the gift 
of deep sorrow.” On the other hand, 
they show us where we are. We dare 
not to deﬁ   ne “under-funding”, but 
the obvious trend of decrease in the 
percentage of the budget for defense, 
coupled with the stagnant amount 
of money allocated to the same 
budget, and with the inﬂ  ation and the 
technological modernization make us feel that resources are far from 
abundant for the desired operational 
usage. In other words, we are interested 
in comparing the initial situation in 
Romania with the situation of the 
allied states which serve as a model 
for us. Only then will we compare our 
estimated efforts with our own, more 
or less formalized, aspirations. A ﬁ  rst 
comparison with other countries is 
the one presented in Figure 1, which 
displays the percentage of GDP [1] 
allocated to defense.
Figure 1.Defense Expenditure (Percent of GDP)
As the ﬁ  gure shows, there is a 
general decreasing tendency of the 
indicator at this time of economic 
crisis. That can also be interpreted in 
terms of reduced dangers of armed 
aggression of any kind, or of states’ 
perception regarding this kind of 
threat. However, the decline is steeper 
for Romania and Bulgaria, the poorest 
EU countries, and this feature leads 
to the idea that existing gaps will 
increase rather than decrease.
When talking about defense 
spending and relating it to the number 
of inhabitants [2], we need to consider 
the effort the states are willing to 
make in order to achieve objectives 
for the defense ﬁ  eld. Figure 2 shows 
the evolution of this index over the 
same period.
Figure. 2. Defense Expenditure per Capita 
As it results from the ﬁ  gure 
above, Romania has the lowest 
defense expenditures per capita and 
that raises concern. However, one 
can also notice the considerable 
difference between the old and new 
group members of the European 
Union. Romania and Bulgaria have 
taken the same path, except that we 
have not exceeded during the period 
studied, the level of 100 Euros per 
capita. This indicator shows that 
there is a reduced likelihood to reduce 
disparities with the Allies.
In fact, reducing these gaps, as 
desired for all sectors of activity, is 
possible only by favoring a particular 
major socio-economic domain or 
through an accelerated economic 
growth, at a faster pace than those 
states with which we compare 
ourselves. The two indicators 
previously discussed show that the 
ﬁ   rst solution cannot be predicted, 
while the European trend shows that 
the concern of the European political 
leadership regarding a future major 
military confrontation is decreasing. 
As for the second solution, it cannot be 
put into practice given the large debts 
to international ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and the investments made in recent years that have been far too little for 
sustainable development.
The third indicator that we study 
is that of defense investments vs. the 
number of military personnel [3]. 
Figure 3 shows the situation of 
this indicator compared to the same 
period of time.
take, whether they are military or 
civilian. Under the strict constraints 
of the economic crisis, the authorities 
have sacriﬁ  ced the most cost structure 
without abandoning the less achievable 
goals, unnecessary or redundant. 
Moreover, it forces the new evidence, 
proposing major investments that 
presumably solve real problems but 
actually create other problems, perhaps 
even more serious.
Simple arithmetic supports these 
statements. Romania spent in 2010, 
$ 119 million for the procurement of 
military equipment. By comparison, 
in the last month of 2012, “the US 
Defense Department said it has 
ﬁ  nalized a contract for the purchase 
of a ﬁ   fth batch of radar-evading 
F-35 Fighter Aircraft from Lockheed 
Martin Corp., a deal worth $3.8 
billion for 32 of the advanced planes” 
(Reuters, 14 Dec 2012) [4]. 
Therefore, such an aircraft would 
cost about $ 119 million, which is 
about 90m Euros, slightly below 
Romania’s total annual expenditure for 
the purchase of equipment in 2010.
However, it is an obvious fact 
that too many choose to build 
chimeras, wasting resources to make 
their exaggerated vision credible. 
In addition, in 2010, Romania’s 
total defense spending totaled 1.575 
billion Euros, and it is also worth 
mentioning that the purchase of 16 
aircraft of the type mentioned before 
costs an amount substantially equal.
Let us now go back to the 
“underfunding’” of the defense. Yes, 
we can talk about this phenomenon if 
we relate it to our own development 
programs. Moreover, we can talk 
about some underfunding if we 
Figure.3. Defense Investment per  Soldier
From our perspective, this is the 
clearest indicator showing inability 
to achieve our own targets in existing 
conditions. The distance that separates 
us from the Netherlands would not be 
so worrisome, since this is a country 
with strong traditions. The problem 
is that Romania’s evolution shows 
that we objectionably neglect exactly 
what we say that we want to do, 
namely to have an army compatible 
in all respects with the Allied Armies. 
A  ﬁ   rst consequence could be shading 
Romanian military reputation that they 
have earned in theaters worldwide. 
Among the countries studied, only 
Romania has such a strong downward 
curve and the continued use of such cost 
structures will, very soon, lead towards 
the inability to ﬁ  ght alongside the Allies.
The presented situation thus 
contradicts most speeches of the 
Romanian personalities in charge 
of the national defense system; 
regardless of the positions they compare the ﬁ   nancial efforts with 
those of Allied countries. On the 
other hand, we believe that the latter 
problem can be solved by rethinking 
the vision of the future army of 
Romania, based on the British 
model dated a few years ago. A brief 
description of a similar model will be 
presented in this paper, as well.
Finally, we feel bound to say 
that all data used are public, and 
countries chosen for comparison 
were established on different criteria: 
Bulgaria and Hungary as neighboring 
countries, with a population of less 
than half the population of Romania 
and countries of the former Soviet 
block, Poland a country from the 
same block which decided to become 
a regional military power, Italy a 
Western European country discreetly 
interested in defense and the 
Netherlands as a signiﬁ  cant military 
power, despite its size.
3. STRATEGIC DEFENSE 
REVIEW
We have mentioned above two 
ways, which are unlikely to solve 
problems unless major changes 
occur: increasing the percentage 
of GDP allocated for defense, and 
an accelerated growth of the GDP, 
respectively. There is also the solution 
of making structural changes, which 
is a more complex and painful one, 
but can lead to long-term beneﬁ  cial 
effects. Unfortunately, a path like 
this can lead to other difﬁ  culties and 
problems. Such an approach requires 
a  ﬂ   awless foundation, through a 
Strategic Defense Review.
We believe that, too often, lack 
of resources makes us plan uselessly 
with no tangible results as we set 
targets that do not have a utility 
basis. Calculation of the multi-role 
aircraft number based on the number 
of existing pilots is quite accurate 
and can be taken into account by 
the decision makers, but it would be 
much more useful and responsible 
if the starting point is the need for 
defense, based on the useful tasks 
that should be fulﬁ  lled.
The close limits of planning are 
quite well-known, in the sense that it 
can not replace the main process to 
which it is dedicated. On the other 
hand, a good quality planning process 
can contribute to the effectiveness and 
efﬁ  ciency of efforts. Quality planning 
must be well grounded, rigorously 
enforced and sufﬁ  ciently  ﬂ  exible 
to allow the necessary corrections 
during the periodic evaluation of 
the results. The Strategic Defense 
Review is the most used method 
for this initial condition serving the 
utility planning: grounding. It is 
the assessment of possible inputs 
and outputs of the system itself, so 
the plan is achievable and realistic. 
Today’s economic and social context, 
marked by the severe economic crisis 
inﬂ  uencing international and national 
levels, mandates the strict inclusion 
of reasonableness into our plans, on 
short and medium term.
The strategic analysis model that 
we present was adapted years ago, 
when there was an attempt to achieve 
an analysis, using a model provided 
by the U.S. experts from the Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) 
[5] Monterey - United States of 
America. The list below shows the 
stages of such an analysis.The framework for the  1. 
Defense Policy.
Accepted Planning Hypothesis. 2. 
Plausible Scenarios/Contingency. 3. 
Military Assumed Missions  4. 
and Responsibilities.
Identifying the Needed  5. 
Military Capabilities.
Creating a Credible and  6. 
Accurate Costs Catalogue.
Identifying Options. 7. 
Options to be taken. 8. 
Allocating Resources and  9. 
Finalizing the Implementation Plan.
The  ﬁ   rst step is the analysis of 
the defense policy, emphasizing what 
should be considered: assessing risks 
and threats, economic and ﬁ  nancial 
projections and the demographic 
analysis. The idea is that these areas 
of analysis are considered mandatory, 
but the subject of the analysis may be 
extended. Given the reality that we 
face today, we considered that the ﬁ  rst 
stage should focus on the following 
components: 1) The Legislative 
Framework; 2) The Institutional 
Framework; 3) The Strategic Planning 
System; 4) Main Risks and Threats; 
5) Economic and Financial Perspectives; 
6) The Demographic Analysis.
The second step is to establish 
planning assumptions, namely the 
establishment of a constant of the 
defense system, such as: membership 
in international organizations; 
goals and objectives as stated in the 
strategic documents; principles and 
the decision making system. These 
assumptions come generally from 
the existing norms and framework.
The third stage is crucial. Thus, the 
successful analysis and development 
of plausible scenarios are derived 
from the system of risks and threats 
to which Romania is exposed, from 
a military perspective. This stage can 
allow the continuation of the analysis 
only if the panel covers all risks 
and threats, so difﬁ  cult when those 
threats are not real. For example, one 
of the greatest global current threats 
is the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. How can Romania 
counter such a threat? Obviously, 
the threat of a general nature should 
be materialized in the possible 
action types, from nuclear attack 
by an aggressor aiming domestic 
objectives and activities, to effective 
participation in arms control or 
military action against countries that 
circumvent the international control. 
Based on these scenarios, the military 
component decides on the missions 
and the tasks they undertake, always 
considering the opportunities offered 
by the membership in international 
organizations and also including 
efforts to minimize potential 
overlaps between national military 
capabilities and those of the Alliance. 
A logical approach to this step allows 
initially for missions and tasks to be 
undertaken by the armed forces to 
achieve the targets, following that 
those components incumbent to the 
national armed forces to be speciﬁ  ed 
later. However, the basic idea is 
that it is absolutely unlikely for the 
national armed forces to carry out 
tasks outside collective defense.
The next stage identiﬁ  es  those 
military capabilities that are 
necessary to carry out the tasks and 
duties described in the previous 
step. Related to these capabilities, which are one of the main outputs 
of the process of analysis, we should 
point out some issues. Even if the 
Dictionary of the Romanian Language 
does not list the word “capability”, 
it is worth reminding that this is a 
concept much resorted to in defense. 
Therefore, we try to describe it as 
accurately as possible. “Capability 
is the ability to achieve a speciﬁ  c 
objective ... or doing something 
in a given situation”. (Touchin, 
“System of Systems Engineering for 
Capability”). This ﬁ  rst  deﬁ  nition, 
which describes the essence of the 
concept, is very general, so we will 
try to narrow it down so as to reﬁ  ne 
our approach. The ddeﬁ  nition agreed 
by the Romanian Ministry of National 
Defense runs as follows: “capability 
is the ability to generate solid 
operating results or desired effect 
in relation to threats, environment 
and contributing coalition partners” 
(Ministry of Defense: Acquisition 
Operating Framework).
The concept has evolved and 
become more commonly used in 
various environments, especially 
in defense, being the basis of a true 
new science. Thus, the capability 
“is the heart of engineering systems, 
although unfortunately it is rarely 
stated as such in these science-based 
approaches” (Neaga, EI, Henshaw, 
M., Yue, Y.: “The Inﬂ  uence  of 
the Concept of Capability-Based 
Management on the Development of 
the Systems Engineering Discipline). 
The capabilities based planning system 
was developed based on this concept 
and it means “to plan in conditions 
of uncertainty, the development of 
capabilities to respond to a wide 
variety of challenges and speciﬁ  c 
circumstances of today, within an 
economic framework that often forces 
your choice” (Davis, A., “Analytic 
Architecture for Capabilities-
Based Planning”). A capability has 
a number of components. While 
for the industrial activity these 
components are, in general, the   
Personnel (Human Resources), Products, 
Processes, Technology and Facilities, in the 
military field the components are specific 
and numerous. A military capability consists 
of the following components: Training, 
Equipment, Personnel, Intelligence, Doctrine 
and Concepts, Organization, Logistics 
Infrastructure. Planning for a military 
capability means to plan all its components.
Developing a credible and 
accurate Costs Catalogue is 
apparently an auxiliary milestone, 
but it is very common in the national 
arena. The Catalogue must take into 
account NATO standards to ensure 
interoperability and to consider the 
fact that most missions are conducted 
within the Alliance or with the 
Alliance member states.
Options should include the 
development of alternative force 
structures, to identify capabilities’ 
deﬁ  ciencies and develop options to 
cover these weaknesses (material 
and non-material).
Priorities have to be established 
because, even when all options are 
required, it is obvious that they cannot 
be covered immediately, especially 
because of the scarcity of resources.
The  ﬁ   nal step is to allocate 
resources and complete 
implementation plans. Beyond this stage, the process of achieving the 
proposed objectives, in a certain order, 
and with all features set begins.
We believe that this model is 
sufﬁ  ciently comprehensive and clear 
for a rational approach to the ﬁ  eld 
and should not be “enriched” with 
various “tricks” to introduce various 
stages consistent with partisan 
interests. We believe that, in order 
to increase defense effectiveness and 
efﬁ  ciency, it is necessary to use the 
most of the opportunities offered by 
the “smart defense” concept.
Under the heading “Building 
security in an age of austerity” the 
NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen presented a call for 
smart defense at the Munich Security 
Conference in February 4, 2011 [6]. 
Starting from the idea of sharp cutting 
budgets for European defense, the 
author says: “The era of one-size-ﬁ  ts-
all defense cooperation is over. What 
matters is to deliver capabilities that 
allow us to operate successfully at 28. 
Smart Defense can do just that. They 
make two challenges today: how to get 
more security for the limited resources 
they devote to defense, and how to invest 
enough to prepare for the future”.
The declaration on capabilities 
was signed by representatives of 
allied states at the Chicago summit 
in May 2012 [7]. Heads of State and 
Government agreed on this occasion, 
for the future as follows: “we have 
conﬁ  dently set ourselves the goal of 
NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly 
connected forces equipped, trained, 
exercised and commanded so that 
they can operate together and with 
partners in any environment”. [8] 
Course objectives can be achieved 
through Smart Defense: “Smart 
Defense is at the heart of this new 
approach. The development and 
deployment of defense capabilities 
is  ﬁ   rst and foremost a national 
responsibility. But as technology 
grows more expensive, and defense 
budgets are under pressure, there are 
key capabilities which many Allies 
can only obtain if they work together 
to develop and acquire them. We 
therefore welcome the decisions 
of Allies to take forward speciﬁ  c 
multinational projects, including for 
better protection of our forces, better 
surveillance and better training. 
These projects will deliver improved 
operational effectiveness, economies 
of scale, and closer connections 
between our forces. They will also 
provide experience for more such 
Smart Defense projects in future”.
“Smart Defense” is the way 
to achieve maximum defense 
effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency.  To  be 
put into practice, “Smart Defense” 
needs correct identiﬁ  cation  of 
required capabilities, multinational 
availability and, especially, trust 
between partners.
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